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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - -- - - - - - - -- - - ----- ----- --- -----: .- ':"~~-,
GARY KENDRICK, Inc., dba
GARY'S DRYWALL and PETERSON
GLASS COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
-vsGENE W. MILLER and RUTH B.
MILLER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil

Defendants and Respondents. )
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - _,_-:;. '":' .;;.~-t-

BRIEF OF A.PNH.LAH'I'.
Appeal from the District

------------------

HILLYARD, LOW &ANDERSON
Gary Anderson
175 East 100 North
Logan, Utah
84321
Attorneys for Defendants-Resp.onde-ats·
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IN T!IE SUPRHIE COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UT!\!!
C/\RY KENDRICK, Inc., dba
GARY'S DRYWALL and PE1ERSON
GLASS COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Appellant,
-vs-

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Civil No. 15995

)

GENE IV. mLLER and RUT!! B.

mLLrn,

)
)
)

Defendants and Respondents. )

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiffs against
llcfendants-landowners who became personally liable for materials
and labor under Section 14-2-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was tried in the District Court of the First
Judicial District in and for Cache County, Utah, the Honorable
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen presiding.

The Court sitting without

a jury granted Judgment in part to Plaintiff and held in part
that Plaintiff's right to recover was partially barred because
or a Lien Rcll'asc executed by l'laintirr.
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RELIEF SOLJCIIT ON J\PPE.'\L
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the !rial Court's
Judgment on the partial invalidity of Plaintiff's cL1im, and for
an order of this Court directing the Trial Court to enter Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the llefendant for the
balance of Plaintiff's claim, the sum of $1,:)09.00, plus interest
and costs.
STATHIENT OF FACTS

In this Brief, the Appellant shall be referred to as the Plairltif:
and the Respondent shall he referred to as the Defendants, and Laron
Wardle dba Sundown Construction, Inc. shall he referred to as Wardle.
At all times pertinent to these proceedings the llcfendants
were the owners of the following described real property in
Cache County, Utah:
A Parcel of land located in the West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 14, Township 11 North, range
1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, being further
described as follows:
Beginning at a point in the East line of said West
half which is South 310.00 feet from a point described
by record as being south 40 rods from the Northeast
corner of said West half; thence continuing South 0°
00' West along said East line, 150.00 feet; thence North
89°05' West 568.50 feet; thence North 0°00' East 150.00
feet; thence South 89°05' East 568.50 feet to the point
of beginning, less the East I rod being used as a city
street.
Plaintiff at all times pertinent hereto was a businessman
furnishing supplies, labor and materials to contractors.
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Defendants had entered into an agreement with Wardle
for the construction of a home for llefendants.

Wardle had

several homes under construction during this same time; two
of whtch 1vcre designated as the Stewart llill Joh and the
'liller Joh (Defendants' home).
Plaintiff furnished to Wardle v;irious materials and supplies
and labor during the times mentioned herein (Tr. p. 6, lines 7

& 9).

'Jhe Stewart llill Job ivas commenced in July, 1975 and
.1.

r

was finished in August, 1975 as far as Plaintiff's furnishing of
materials, labor and supplies was concerned (Tr. p. 9, lines 3-19)
and that Plaintiff's hill for the Stewart !Jill Joh was $1,309.00.

t,
i'

On August 27, 1975, Wardle came to Plaintiff's place
of business and gave to Joel Cowan, Plaintiff's Manager, a
check in the amount of $1,309.00 (Tr. p. 18, lines 11-15) which
1vas designated by Wardle to be for the Stewart Ilill Job
(Tr. p. 18, lines 16-21 f1 p. 31, lines 2-9).

Joel Cowan signed a

Lien Release in exchange for the $1,309.00 paid by Wardle (Tr.
p. 19, lines 15-17, lines 19 & 20), which particular Lien
Release was signed in blank (Tr. p. 19, lines 13

& 14)

and intended

by hoth Wardle and Cowan to release the Stewart Hill Job.

Subsequent to August 27, 1975, and approximately on September
2, 1975, Plaintiff commenced furnishing labor and materials to
Defendants, and on September 24, 1975, Plaintiff finished furnishing
1.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\

-

sheetrock and labor on llC'fendants' home (Tr. p. 8,

lines 41n,

with a total amount of $2,516.lL'l. ThC'rC' is no dispute that
this sum has not beC'n paid.
Subsequent to the time he paid Joel Cowan the check [or

$1,309.00 on the Stewart llill .Job, Wardle through mistake or inad·

vertance, filled in the blank Lien ReleasC' recC'ived from Joel
Cowan with the words "For South Bench Providence Mi I !er llome"
(Tr. p. 30, lines 5-23).

It was never intended by Wardle to

release any sums that subsequently became due and payable to
Plaintiff (Tr. p. 30, Jines 24, 25; p . .~I,

I inc 1).

Subsequently, Wardle presented the Lien Release (Exhibit S)
to First

~ational

Bank, Logan, Utah, and sums were deducted

from Defendants' account and the sums were apparently paid to
Wardle.
Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants to collect
the sum of $2,516.93 plus interest and costs under Section 14-2-1,
U.C.A. by virtue of Defendants having failed to secure a bond
and for sums not paid by the general contractor, Wardle.
This matter was tried 1n the above Court on April 6, 1978.
The Court granted Plaintiff Judgment but offset the Judgment by
$1,309.00 holding that the Lien Release signed by .Joel Cowan,

in blank, was a valid release and that the amount covered by it
should be deducted from the $2,516.93

01vc<l

Plaintiff by Defendant~
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From the FinJings anJ the Judgment allowing a JeJuction,
Plajnt iff appeals.
l\RCU~lENT

Plaintiff has a valid claim against Defendants and said
claim should be enforced by this Court.
Under the Provisions of Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:
"14-2-1.
Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. -The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract
involving ~500 or more, for the construction, ... improvem~nt
upon lanJ shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract
price, with good and sufficient sureties, ... "

and Section 14-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides

''14-2-2.
Failure to require bond--Direct liability-I.imitation of actions. -- Any person subject to the provisions
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required,
shall he personally liable to all persons who have furnished
materials or performed labor under the contract for the
reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall
be commenced within one year from the last date the last
materials were furnished or the labor performed."

Defendants failed to comply with the above-stated Provisions
of the Utah Code and became personally liable to Plaintiff for the
materials furnished to the Defendants by and through Laron Wardle
doing business as Sundown Construction, Inc.
The Court granted Judgment in favor of Defendants, but deducted
there C1·om the sum of $1, :)09. 00 holding that Johnson Construction
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Company -vs- Kennedy, S:\l P.2d 10'\8 was controlling.
In the instant case, the facts ;,ire substantially different
than those of the Johnson Case.
FIRST:

In the .Johnson Case, Longstroth, the contractor, became

heavily indebted to Johnson, the supplier, and paid to Johnson an
amount in excess of the amount due and owing for the Kennedy Joh,
and without apparent designation as to which accounts the money
should he applied.
In the instant case, Plaintiff furnished labor and materials
to Wardle for a job known as the Stewart llill Job, commen.cing July
21,

1975, and completed in August,

1975 (Tr. p.

9,

lines 3-16).

The total amount of this job was $1,309.00 (Tr. p. 9, line 2:1).
Wardle came to Plaintiff's place of business and presented to
Plaintiff's agent a check for $1,309.00 (Tr. p. 18, lines 11-15)
and designated that the amount was for the Stewart Hill Job
(Tr. p. 18, lines 19-21).
SECOND:

In the Johnson Case, after Longstroth had received

a payment from Kennedy's lender, he then obtained a Lien Waiver
from Johnson.
In the instant case, Wardle paid in full the Stewart Hill
Job with his own funds and received a Lien Release concurrent
therewith (Tr. p.

20,

lines 19-21).

It wasn.'t until sometime

later that Wardle went to the bank, presented the l.ien Release
and secured payment (Tr. p. :rn, lines

~l-ll).
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l I! I

J{I) :

Tn

the .Johnson case, the contractor apparently let

the p;1yment s to supp Ii crs go and thereby became heavily indebted
to Johnson, and thereby created an open account covering several
JObs.
l

n the instant case, such was not the case.

Wardle paid

his hills upon the completion of each job as far as Plaintiff
1vas concerned (Tr. p. 22, lines 15-20).

Furthermore, in the

inst:int case, Wardle paid Plaintiff for the labor and material
on the Stewart !!ill Job prior to the time Plaintiff was to
furnish labor and materials on the Defendants' home (Miller Job)
(Tr. p. 7, lines 7-11).
FOURT!l:

In the Johnson Case, it appears that the contractor

ohtaincd Lien Waivers and Releases for the purpose of obtaining
payments for other jobs and then made payments to the supplier.
In the instant case, the contractor paid for the Lien Release
before he submitted it to anyone else (Tr. p. 18, lines 11-23).
FIFTH:

In the Johnson Case, the contractor made it a practice

or first obtaining J.ien Releases for the purpose of obtaining money
from the lenders.
Jn the instant case, Wardle always paid for the Lien Releases
at the same time (Tr. p. 20, lines 19-21; p. 22, lines 15-19) and
designated the job for which the payment was to be applied.
There was always consideration paid for the execution of the Lien
Relc:1-;e (Tr. p. 22, lines 15-19).
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Additionally, in looking at t:.xhihit S,

it

is apparent that

Wardle already considered himself to have paid for the Lien Release,
A Lien Release mu-,t he construed as to the intention of the
parties.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, illcchanic's Liens, Sec. 294.

The lower Court held that the Lien

l~ele;1sc

signed in hlank on

August 27, 1975 was a valid release as to the $1,309.00 due and
owing Plaintiff by Defendants and thereby barred Plaintiff from
recovering.

Such an application of the law is unsupportable in

the instant case.
Mechanic's Liens arc subject to the s;1mc rules of construction
as other contracts.

The following clements are necessary to have

a valid Lien Release:
1)

Valuable consideration.

Plaintiff has not to date

received any consideration for the Release of Lien imputed by
the Court.

53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 292 states:

"A waiver or release of a mechanic's lien by contract
or agreement, specifically, a contract executed in the course
of or following the completion of the work, must, like other
contracts, be supported by a legal consideration to be valid
and binding
that is, there must he a consideration except
where there is an estoppel.
"
2)

Intention to waive or release a Lien.

That knowledge,

intention or consent of the person entitled to the Lien is necessary
to the waiver of the Lien ... " 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Liens, Sec.
290.

In the instant case the intent of the parties was to release thE

Stewart Ilill Job--not the Miller .Joh (Tr. p.

18,

lines 7-21).
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Re l c J ·, c

\laterial
111: i

-

furnished before the Lien \VJiver.

Y be exec u t e d re l ea s i n g [ u 1 1)'

.·i

While a Lien

l 1 c J aims
·
d ue an d owing
·

at the time the Lien Release was given, it certainly cannot be
coristiued to apply to materials or labor supplied after the date
of the release. 53 Am . .Jur. 2d,

~!echanic's

Liens, Sec. 293.

In the instant case, the date and execution of the release
was August 27, 1975.

The Miller .Joh was not started until

September 2, 1975 (Tr. p. 7, lines 8, 9).

This Court has discussed

this very point in Brimwood Homes, Inc. vs Knudsen Builders Supply
Co., 14 Ut. 419, 385 P.Zd 982.

In construing the language of

a Lien Waiver, the Court stated:
This receipt is executed and delivered by the
undersigned to the Association to induce it to make payment
to the undersigned of the above stated sum from funds held
hy it for the owner of above described real property and in
considc1ation thereof the undersigned hereby waives, releases
and discharaes any lien or ri ht to lien the undersi ned has
or may hereafter acquire against said property.''
Emphasis added
The Court said:
"Under the circumstances of this case we do not believe
that the defendant, nor the plaintiff, intended that the
release and waiver agreement would relate to any future lien
rights which the defendant might acquire. The executed
documents, designated as a 'release and waiver' related
only to the particular debt paid and receipted for in the
particular transaction encompassed by that particular
instrument. This included any lien the defendant 'has or may
hereafter acquire against said property' in regard only
to that particular debt."
"Furthermore it must be noted that the defendant,
in receiving the ~ayments from Prudential, was being p~id
no more than what it was legally entitled to at that time.
lh11s, a promi sc by the defendant. to waive r~ghts ~o f~ture
l ic11s
for other dchts would be without consideration.
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In Boise Cascade Corpor:ition -vs- Stephens, 572 l'.2d
1380, 1382, Justice Crockett, while conct1rring with the main
opinion, added the following comments:
''It must be recogni:ed that after a right to receive
money, including 1vages, has accrued, it is a legitimate
subject of waiver. llowever, with respect to the waiver
of the right to liens which may accrue in the future,
the situation is somewhat different. A primary purpose
of the lien statutes is to guard against a laborer
(or a material supplier) from working on a building and
being cheated of the reward of his labor and thus
avoiding evil consequences to him, his family, and the
economy generally.
If he can be required to sign away
his rights prospectively, the purpose of the statute
can be (and likely will be) defeated.
Because of
the fact that such agreements to waive future rights
to liens are in contravention of the law and its purpose,
I think that courts should refuse to enforce such a
covenant to waive rights to liens which may accrue in
the futitrr' as being contrary to the law and public
policy.
"
To apply the Johnson Case to this case would have the
effect to have Plaintiff release his rights prospectively,
and thereby defeat the purpose of the lien statute.
Clearly the evidence shows that Wardle and Plaintiff's agent
clearly intended to release the Stewart Iii 11 Job commenced in
July and finished in August, 1975, not Defendants' job commenced
on September Z, l'.175.

Thus Plaintiff submits that the BrimwooJ

Homes Case is controlling as to this point.
The conduct of Wardle should not operate as an estoppel
to Plaintiff since the intention of Wardle and Plaintiff was to
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rel ea:;e the Ste1vart Iii 11 .Job an<l not the llefen<lants'.

While Wardle

di<l change the intent of the Lien Release, he did so without the
knowlc<lgc or intent of Plaintiff.

Thus if Wardle is construed

to he Plaintiff's agent, he acted beyond his scope of authority
either expressly or impliedly, and such shoul<l not operate to bar
Plaintiff's claim of $1,309.00.
CONCLUSION
On August 27, 1975, in exchange for the sum of $1,309.00
paid to Plaintiff's agent by Wardle, the agent executed a Lien
Relea,-;e for a project known as the Stewart Hill Job having been
so designated by Wardle, a job having nothing to do with Defendants'
home.
On September 2, 1975, Plaintiff commenced furnishing labor and
material to Defendants home for which he has not been paid in the
amount of $1,309.00.
Sometime after August 27, 1975, Wardle, through mistake or
inadvertance, but certainly beyond any scope of authority, took
the said Lien Release, filled in the same, designated the
Ilefen.Jan1s home herein instead of the Stewart llill Job for which
joh Wardle had paid $1,309.00 to secure said Lien Release and
presented it to Defendants' bank for payment.
fhe Court held that the execution of a release in blank
~rmc<l Wardle with the authority of Plaintiff an<l cited the Johnson
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Case for its so.le reason.
Plaintiff contenJs that upon the facts, the Johnson Case
is so different in fact from the instant case that certainly it
should not be controlling; and that in fact the BrimwooJ llomes
Case is controlling.
DefenJants failed to secure a bond and by Statute became
personally liable to Plaintiff for the labor anJ materials furnishee
by Plaintiff for which they owe the Plaintiff a balance of

$1,309.~

and DefenJants certainly shoulJ not be allowed to use a
release signed six days before the work commcnceJ on their home
by Plaintiff to har Plaintiff from his claim.

If DefcnJants

have a claim, it would seem that it woulJ he against Wardle not
Plaintiff.

DefenJants paiJ no consideration to Plaintiff for

the release, and without consideration, the release is anJ should
be invalid.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON, HOGGAN

~

SORENSON

~,;k---

Attorneys for Pl~dntiffs-1\ppellant
56 \'lest Center
Logan, Utah
84~21

I hereby certify that I served two (2) copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief on Dcfendants-l~cspondcnts by
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Jclivcry of said copies to Gary Anderson, Attorney for UefendantsRcspondcnts, this

4

day of Septcmhcr, 1978.

'
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~/ ';/}p.
SorenS<6n

(),.~\'I.
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